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NOTES
Landowner's Negligence Liability to Persons
Entering as a Matter of Right or Under
a Privilege of Private Necessity
I. INTRODUCTION

In modem tort law, the liability of occupiers of land for their
negligence depends in the first instance upon the status of the
plaintiff upon the premises. This status generally determines the
level of duty which the occupier owes him, and a .vast body of case
law has developed dealing with the many aspects of the question.
Of the myriad classes of persons to whom some duty of care may
be owed by an occupier, perhaps those who enter the premises by
virtue of a legal right, and irrespective of the consent of the occupier,
present the most elusive problems in analysis. It is the purpose of
this article to investigate the liability of occupiers of land to the
following broad categories of persons who enter the premises as of
legal right: (1) firemen and policemen acting in their official
capacities, (2) other public employees acting in the scope of their
employment, and (3) persons who enter the premises pursuant to
a privilege for the purpose of saving persons or property from. har-ii
II. Occupmns" LABiLitY To FIREMEN AND POLICEMEN

The courts have approached the fireman and the policeman cases
from the same point of view that has been employed in land possessor
cases generally, and these officers have thus been held to be licensees
in the overwhelming majority of cases.' However, while in many cases
the courts' refusal to allow recovery may have been justified, commentators have for many years regarded this rationale as unsound 2
For example, it has been observed that it is incongruous to say that
1. E.g., Roberts v. Rosenblatt, 146 Conn. Supp. 110, 148 A.2d 142 (Sup. Ct. 1959);
Baxley v. Williams Constr. Co., 98 Ga. App. 662, 106 S.E.2d 799 (1958); Scheuer
v. Trustees of Open Bible Church, 175 Ohio St. 163, 192 N.E.2d 38 (1963); cf.

Walker Hauling Co. v. Johnson, 110 Ga. App. 620, 139 S.E.2d 496 (1964)

(fireman

from neighboring town who was injured while voluntarily fighting fire caused by

occupier's negligence stated a cause of action under rescue doctrine); Mistelske v.
Kravco, Inc., 88 Pa. D. & C. 49, (C.P. 1953) (fireman implied invitee as to dangers
not created by fire); Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v. Campagna, 146 Tenn. 389, 242 S.W.
646 (1922) (fireman answering call outside city limits held to be invitee); Prosser,
Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 MrNN. L. REv. 573, 608-11 (1942); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoaN), ToRTs § 345 (1965).
2. Bohlen, The Duty of a Landowner Towards Those Entering His Premises of
Their Own Right, 69 U. PA. L. REv. 340-44 (1921); Pkosser,-supra note 1, -at 61'0.
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a fireman on the defendant's premises to fight a fire cannot be an
invitee because there has been no invitation, but that he is a licensee
even though in reality the occupier has not granted him permission
to enter.3 If the courts have occasionally appeared to be groping,
it is reasonably clear that they have been striving to find the proper
level of duty to impose upon occupiers of land with reference to
firemen and policemen who come upon the premises in the performance of their duty. Clearly they are are not trespassers, since
they are rightfully on the land. On the other hand, it has long
been contended that to impose upon occupiers the duty owed to
invitees would bring about unjust results. Firemen and policemen
enter premises at any hour and at unpredictable places, 4 and occupiers
have generally not been required to anticipate their presence in
remote or private sections of their premises. 5 This state of the law
derives originally from the historical immunities which were conferred
upon possessors of land at common law, and which continue to wield
considerable influence, perhaps beyond logical justification under
modem conditions. In more recent years some courts have apparently
concluded that the classification of licensee ill fits firemen and policemen and have declared them to be sui generis.6 This change in
classification has not, however, resulted in widespread change in the
duty owed them.7 Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a meaningful
lvel of duty which would fit neatly between the duty owed to
licensees and that owed to invitees. For the reasons already suggested,
3. Ibid.
4. Prosser, supra note 1, at 610: "It is worthy of note that in every one of the
cases in which recovery has been denied to such plaintiffs, some such element of unusual
and unexpected entry has been present."
5. Baxley v. Williams Constr. Co., supra note 1, at 669, 106 S.E.2d at 805: "The
rule is based on sound public policy. In the first place the right of a fireman to go
upon premises to extinguish a fire is based on the permission of the law and not an
invitation of the owner or occupier even if the owner or occupier turns in the alarm.
Such a permission is one which the occupier or owner may not deny. The basic
reason for the rule is that it is impossible to forecast the precise place where or time
when the firemen's duties may call him, and to require an owner or occupier of
premises to exercise at all times the high degree of care owed to an invitee in order
to guard against so remote and unpredictable an injury would be an intolerable burden
which is not in the best interest of society to impose." See PnossEn, ToTs § 61, at
407 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as PRossEn].
B. E.g., Buren v. Midwest Indus., Inc., 380 S.W.2d 96 (Ky. App. 1964); Shypulski
v. Waldorf Paper Prods. Co., 232 Minn. 394, 45 N.W.2d 549 (1951); Jackson v.
Velveray Corp., 82 N.J. Super. 469, 198 A.2d 115 (App. Div. 1964); Larson v. First
Nat'l Bank, 37 Misc. 2d 678, 236 N.Y.S.2d 297 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
7. Thus in Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Prods. Co., supra note 6, at 402, 45 N.W.2d
at 553, the court said, "[W e believe that the better rule by far is that landowners
and occupants alike owe a duty to firemen to warn them of hidden perils where the
landowner or occupant has knowledge of the peril and the opportunity to give
warning." This is the same level of duty adopted by the Restatement in regard to
licensees. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 342 (1965).
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firemen and policemen have generally not been allowed to recover
for their injuries to the same extent as have other public employees
who are injured while on premises in the discharge of their duties.?
There have developed, however, certain types of factual situations ii
which the courts have responded favorably to actions brought by firemen and policemen.
For the sake of convenience, the cases will be considered here as
they fall into one or more of the following factual classifications;
(1) dangerous conditions on the premises-not related to the fire in
case of firemen; (2) dangerous activities on the premises-not related
to the fire in case of firemen; (3) negligent maintenance of the
premises so as to increase the likelihood of fire; (4) unusually dangerous substances and conditions on the premises that have either caused
the fire or which are made more immediately dangerous by the
fire.9

A. DangerousConditionson the Premises
The typical case of defective floors or stairways unknown to the
occupier of the premises, may be used to illustrate the situation in
which a fireman or policeman will usually not be allowed to recover
for injuries suffered thereby. 10 The fact that he is a licensee excuses
the occupier from any duty to discover the danger," and the plaintiff
takes the premises as he finds them. There is one important exception
to this rule. If the dangerous condition exists on a part of the
premises "then held open to the public," the occupier owes to the
fireman and policeman the same duty owed to an invitee. 2 The3
Restatement of Torts has adopted this principle in its second edition
and there would seem to be little question as to its merit. It -is irmportant to notice, however, that there is a paucity of decisional
authority to support it.'4 The New York Court of Appeals established
the doctrine in 1920 in the case of Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery.15
8. PROSSER § 61, at 406-07.
9. This is not to say that four distinct lines of authority have developed. As will be
seen, in many cases the various factors are intermingled.
10. Another situation illustrated in a recent decision is ice on a sidewalk. Roberts v.

Rosenblatt, supra note 1.
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), ToRTs § 342, comment d (1965).

12. Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery, 229 N.Y. 10, 127 N.E. 491 (1920); Taylor v.
Palmetto Theater Co., 204 S.C. 1, 28 S.E.2d 538 (1943).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), ToRTS § 345 (1965).
14. In addition to the cases cited in note 12 supra, there is apparently only the
following: Learoyd v. Godfrey, 138 Mass. 315 (1885) (policeman injured when be
fell into a well near a common passageway in a building in which the owner leased
portions to various tenants).
15. Supra note 12. In this case a fireman was injured by falling into a coal pit in

driveway which was used by those who had business with the defendant as a means
of access to defendant's buildings. The court was extremely careful in articulating. the

ground of its holding. "[B]ut we limit our decision to the precise facts before us. To
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The New York courts, 16 as well as courts in other jurisdictions,1 7
have subsequently not allowed the rule to be expanded. Neverthe-

less, in a case which does come within what is now the Restatement
rule, there will likely be a jury question as to the exercise of reasonable care by the occupier, 18 subject of course to the defenses normally

available in invitee cases. Certainly, the defendant's liability should
be entirely dependent upon satisfactory proof of negligence, and the
plaintiff should not be assured of recovery simply because he is
labeled an invitee. 19
It is equally clear that classifying a fireman or a policeman as a
licensee should not be tantamount to directing a verdict for the
defendant. 20 The more enlightened view of the Restatement2 ' recogthe case of one not a licensee entering business property as of right over a way
prepared as a means of access for those entitled to enter who is injured by the negligence of the owner in failing to keep that way in a reasonably safe condition for those
using it as it was intended to be used." Id. at 17, 127 N.E. at 493.
16. Larson v. First Nat'l Bank, supra note 6. In this case a policeman was injured
when he fell on construction debris on bank premises while making a night patrol. In
denying recovery, the court stated that the fact that bank patrons used the portion of
the lawn where the plaintiff was injured as a shortcut during business hours did not
constitute it an ordinary means of access where there was available a defined and
prepared means of access. See also Beedenbender v. Midtown Properties, Inc., 4
App. Div. 2d 276, 164 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1st Dep't 1957) (policeman injured while
patrolling rear yard of business premises when he climbed a fence and fell into a
depression on the other side; recovery denied).
17. Scheuer v. Trustees of Open Bible Church, supra note 1, in which a policeman
was denied recovery for injuries sustained when he fell into an unlighted excavation
extending into a driveway on church premises as he approached the church building
to investigate a reported burglary. The court did not actually distinguish the Melers
case, but rather held the plaintiff to be a licensee as a matter of law, relying strongly
on its belief that injured policemen and firemen should be compensated for their
injuries exclusively from public funds.
18. See generally James, The Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58
YALF, L.J. 667 (1949); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), ToRTs §§ 328B, C (1965).
19. Baxley v. Williams Constr. Co., supra note 1 (concurring opinion). In this case
a fireman fell into an open hole while fighting a fire at a construction project where
there were numerous excavations and obstacles to free access. While the majority
opinion held the plaintiff to be a licensee, and therefore not entitled to a duty of
reasonable care, the concurring opinion argued that a sounder basis for the holding
would be that under the circumstances "ordinary care" did not compel the defendants
to mark the hole, and that they were therefore not negligent. In most cases, however,
the court cannot be expected to take the question of reasonable care from the jury,
and the jury can probably be expected to interpret "reasonable care" as requiring some
effort to make the premises safe under most circumstances.
20. In some cases of even relatively recent vintage, the courts have declared the
duty of an occupier toward a licensee to be to refrain from wilful or wanton injury,
Anderson v. Cinnamon, 365 Mo. 304, 282 S.W.2d 445 (1955); or from allowing
"pitfalls, mantraps, and things of that kind" to exist. Baxley v. Williams Constr. Co.,
supra note 1, at 669, 106 S.E.2d at 805. See Carroll v. Hemenway, 315 Mass. 45, 51
N.E.2d 952 (1943), in which a policeman was denied recovery, the court holding that
he was a licensee and could not recover "on the ground of negligence, whether ordinary
or gross"; Aldworth v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 295 Mass. 344, 3 N.E.2d 1008 (1936).
21. REsTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 342 (1965). The language of the Restatement expresses the duty in the alternative, that is, either to make safe or to warn.
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nizes that even the licensee is owed a warning of conditions which
involve unreasonable risk of harm and which are known to the occupier if he knows of the licensee's presence and has opportunity to
warn. This concept has been correctly applied in some cases,2
unwisely circumscribed in others z and apparently ignored in others.2
A more difficult question is presented when the occupier knows of
the dangerous condition but is not present or is unaware of the
presence of the fireman or policeman. Under such circumstances, the
prevailing rule apparently is that the existence of the danger does
not itself violate a duty to the fireman or policeman unless it can
be said to amount to a trap or to wilful or wanton misconduct. z
And, insofar as firemen and policemen are concerned, these latter
terms are employed most frequently only as a preface to holding them
inapplicable. 26 The current status of this doctrine is difficult to
evaluate properly in broad outline. It is true that, with possibly
one special exception to be discussed later, the presence of firemen
and policemen on official missions cannot realistically be termed
foreseeable. Moreover, as mentioned before, immunity for land
22. Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Prods. Co., supra note 6, in which the court overruled
defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's allegation that defendant's officers and employees
were present at the fire, that they knew of the dangerous condition of a certain wall,
and that they failed to warn the plaintiff fireman so that he might avoid being injured
by its collapse. The court classified the plaintiff as sui generis, but the duty it outlined in regard to him was the same as the modern view of the duty owed to licensees.
Cf. Beedenbender v. Midtown Properties, supra note 16; Davy v. Greenlaw, 101
N.H. 134, 135 A.2d 900 (1957), in which the courts acknowledged the modem rule
to be correct, but in which it failed to inure to the benefit of the plaintiffs under
the facts involved.
23. Anderson v. Cinnamon, supra note 20. The court distinguished between cases
in which the defendant had knowledge of the presence of explosives and those in which
he had knowledge of a deteriorated structural condition on the premises. Ir ,the former
the defendant was said to be under a duty to warn; in the latter he was uhder no
such duty. It should be noted, however, that in this case the defendant apparently
did not realize that the plaintiff intended to go upon the weakened balcony until he
was already there. As further justification for its position, the court said, "It would also
be likely to interfere with the operations of the firemen in fighting the fire for a
possessor to undertake to tell them where to go and where not to go." Id. at 309,
282 S.W.2d at 448.
24. See note 20 supra.
25. See, e.g., Schwab v. Rubel Corp., 286 N.Y. 525, 37 N.E.2d 234 (1941), in which
the defendant's employee failed to warn the plaintiff-fireman of a hole left during
renovation of the premises. In holding that the jury could have found that the condition
existed to the knowledge and resultant responsibility of the defendants, the court stated,
"It may be that had the employee failed, there would have been no liability. We do
not pass on that." But see Mistelske v. Kravco, Inc., supra note 1, in which a fireman
was designated an "implied invitee' by the trial court for purposes of determining
defendant's liability for injuries caused by a falling elevator counter-balance. The
higher court affirmed the jury's verdict for defendant. Jackson v. Velveray Corp., supra
note 6, in which the court said that a fireman could recover for undue risks created
by conditions including open elevator shafts, storage of dangerous substances and
other conditions independent of the fire itself.
App. 494 (1930).
26. Supra note 20. But see Bandosz v. Daigger & Co., 255 Ill.
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6ccupiers is still an influential concept in the law and its vitality
appears to be strong despite gradual inroads over the years.2 7 Nevertheless, an appealing case can be made for the imposition of some
gFeater duty upon occupiers than is presently recognized. The rationle of the Restatement rule that firemen and policemen are owed
the same duty owed to invitees while on parts of the premises held
open to the public appears to be that the public officer is entitled to
rely upon the appearance of safety created by the occupier in anticipation of visits by the public.2 8 It should be noted, however, that the
public officer may not fit precisely within the Restatement definition
of invitee.2 He will normally not enter for a purpose for which the
premises are held open to the public, nor for a purpose connected
with business dealings with the occupier. Certainly this is not to
say that his visit is of no interest or benefit to the occupier, but
'dearly the relationship is different from that contemplated by the
'Restatement in its definition of invitees. The duty owed to him
arses because the reasons given for denying liability for injuries
suffered on private premises-no opportunity for the occupier to
foresee his presence and to make the premises safe-do not exist.
In effect, then, firemen and policemen are given the benefit of a
,duty owed to the public, and the occupier's total duty of care is not
increased by being extended to cover plaintiffs who enter on official
duty.
' This reasoning also has utility when the occupier's duty is analyzed
with reference to parts of the premises not held open to the public.
Particularly is this true of commercial or industrial premises where
"he occupier is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain
passageways, and the like, in a reasonably safe condition for employees. 30 While the presence of a fireman or policeman on official
" "27. The Restatement continues to express the general rule concerning trespassers to
.be that there is no duty either to put and keep the land in a reasonably safe condition
or to carry on activities so as not to endanger them. RE STATE MENT (SECOND), Tons
.§ 333 (1965). There immediately follow, however, a number of exceptions to the
rule under which the law will prefer the welfare of even a trespasser to the occupier's
untrammeled right to use his premises as he sees fit. Id. at §§ 334-39.
' 28. Id., § 345, comment e.
29. Id., § 332.
"Invitee Defined
(.1) An invitee is either a public invitee or a business visitor.
' (2) A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land as a
member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the public.
(3) A business visitor is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land for a
pb-pose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor of
,land."
30. REsTATEmENT (SECOND), AcENcY § 492 (1958). The fact that the defendant's
(employees might be under a workmen's compensation plan which constitutes their
exclusive remedy against their employer would not eliminate his common law duty to
provide a safe place to work.
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duty may not be foreseeable, the presence of employees and perhaps
others to whom a duty of reasonable care is owed may be foreseeable.
Thus, to allow the fireman or policeman to benefit from the duty
already existing would not impose an additional burden on the
occupier. 31 The thrust of this reasoning is that the cases should be
made to turn on questions of fact, including the question whether the
occupier was under a duty with reference to any class of persons.
Where the evidence raises questions concerning which reasonable

minds might differ, the jury should be permitted to have the case
with instructions containing at least the following elements: The

plaintiff must have been in the place where he was injured in an
official capacity, and because his presence there was reasonably
necessary to the discharge of his duty; and the place must have been
one concerning which the occupier owed a duty of reasonable care
to some class of persons. If the jury finds that the occupier was

under a duty of care under the circumstances, they would then
proceed to try the issues of liability and damages. If the jury finds, or
if under the evidence the court directs, that the occupier was under

no duty of care of the level owed to invitees, he might still be held
to the same duty owed to licensees.3 Thus, the occupier of a private
dwelling would generally be under no duty to make his attic stairs

safe for firemen, because he would not usually anticipate the presence
of persons other than members of his family in the attic.3 In relating

the duty owed to firemen and policemen to an existing duty owed
31. This statement is certainly true in a general sense.' However, it can also be
argued that to allow recovery by persons who are not in the actual class of those whose
presence the occupier can foresee increases the likelihood of a successful action against
him by simply expanding the number of potential plaintiffs, and thereby increasing the
probability that one of them will suffer injury. In this respect, the rule regardihg
public premises is distinguishable from the present situation. In that case the occupier
is on notice that an indeterminate number of people, most of whom are strangers, will
visit his premises, while those who are permitted to go into the private sections of the
premises may be a relatively small and familiar group. It must be remembered,
however, that the basis of any action for injury would be negligence, and that the
defendant would, under the suggestions offered here, be held to the same standard of
care applicable in relation to his employees or others to whom a duty of care is owed.
Therefore, through the exercise of reasonable care to discover defects and corrct
them, the occupier would have fulfilled his duty to any class of persons, firemen and
policemen included.
32. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
33. Here again, the total situation would determine the occupier's duty. The, fact
that the speculative presence of a repairman in the attic would give rise to a duty
would not entitle the jury to find for the plaintiff in the absence of evidence that the
actual presence of invitees was reasonably foreseeable. Moreover, where the ocoupier
could reasonably foresee the presence of only social guests in his house, there would
be no duty to a fireman other than the duty owed licensees. See Roberts v. Rosenblatt,
supra note 1, in which a fireman was denied recovery when he fell on a sidewalk leading
to an apartment house while answering an alarm on a wintry night. The reasoning of
the decision would be applicable in connection with .a private dwelling.
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to others, it also becomes necessary to evaluate the standard of care
which should be required of the occupier. For example, the interior of
a manufacturing plant may be reasonably safe for employees who
are familiar with the environment, but full of hidden danger to the
fireman who has never been there before. Balancing the interest of
the occupier in making profitable use of the premises against that of
the plaintiff in passing safely on his mission, it would appear that
the occupier should be held to no greater standard of care with
reference to firemen or policemen than he is required to exercise in
connection with the class to whom the primary duty is owed. If,
therefore, the condition is one which the reasonably prudent employee
would have detected and avoided, the plaintiff-fireman should not
recover, and the jury should be so instructed. Again, situations may
frequently arise in which the fireman or policeman enters the premises
at night, or at other times when the occupier has no reason to expect
that anyone will be present. This is, of course, the basic situation
which has provided the rationale for denial of liability in the cases.m
As a general proposition, the rule of non-liability appears to be sound
under circumstances in which safety depends, for example, upon a
degree of illumination which is normally provided only when the
presence of people should be expected. 35 However, where the injury
is caused by a latent defect, such as a weakened floor, which could
have been discovered by reasonable inspection, and where the fact
that the premises were closed did not increase the risk, the plaintiff
should-not be barred. It should be borne in mind that the justification for this line of reasoning is that these plaintiffs are not only
privileged to be upon the premises, but are compelled by their duty
to be there, and that the occupier by hypothesis has a duty to exercise reasonable care with regard to a class of persons whose presence
is foreseeable. Therefore, the plaintiff should be entitled to assume
that the ways which have apparently been provided for movement
through the premises by those entitled to be there are reasonably safe
for him as well.3s Of course, the fireman may frequently be required
to go beyond the bounds of safety in discharging his duty, and in
such cases the occupier should be allowed to rely upon the defenses
34. See note 4 supra.
35. In any case, however, the reasonableness of the occupier's act or failure to act
would of necessity depend upon all the surrounding circumstances. Thus, in Mejers
v. Fred Koch Brewery, supra note 12, it appeared that the plaintiff fell into a bole in
a driveway at night. The occupier had apparently installed lights but they were not
burning at the time. The court did not specifically find that the premises were open to
the public at the time of the accident, but relied upon the fact that the driveway was
the normaLmeans of public access.
36. YFor.. a good discussion of the relative merits of the "invitation" and the
"economic bene.fit: theories of occupiers' duty in invitee cases, see Prosser, supra note 1.
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of contributory negligence and assumption of risk.
There have been a number of cases in which firemen and policemen have been injured by falling into elevator shafts, 38 or by falling
on defective fire escapes.39 Conditions of such extremely hazardous
nature perhaps warrant special consideration here. It is urged that
occupiers should be held to a duty of taking reasonable steps to
provide adequate safety precautions insofar as unusually dangerous
conditions are concerned.40 The utility of such a condition in an
unguarded state may occasionally be important, but this would not
generally be so. Where the expense or inconvenience of providing
a barricade or a light, or some other reasonable device, is slight
when compared with the likelihood that serious injury or death will
be the result of any accident connected with the condition, the occupier should be under a duty to provide such precautions. In this
regard, the general criteria of reasonable care under all the circumstances would enable the jury to evaluate the risk by emphasizing
the degree of harm that would probably be suffered rather than the
foreseeability that people would encounter the condition. 4' Therefore, while the occupier's duty might still be properly related to
classes of persons whose presence was foreseeable, this factor would
be less important in connection with the type of condition being
considered here because the unforeseeable nature of the fireman's
presence would be relatively less important. Moreover, the duty
would not ordinarily be unduly burdensome upon the 'occupier,
because he would normally know or have reason to know of the
existence of such a condition.42 He would be subject to liability
37. Thus, if a fireman climbs over a safety barricade in order to obtain a better
vantage point from which to direct a hose onto a blaze, he has assumed the risk
inherent in removing the measure of safety provided by the occupier. See generally
PnossEa § 67, at 450-69.
38. See, e.g., denying liability on common law grounds, Hamilton v. Minneapolis
Desk Mfg. Co., 78 Minn. 3, 80 N.W. 693 (1899); Beehler v. Daniels, 18 R.I. 563,
29 At. 6 (1894).
39. Aldworth v. F. M. Woolworth Co.; 295 Mass. 344, 3 N.E.2d 1008 (1936). The
court there held that the fireman could not recover on a common law theory of ordinary
negligence, but must show wilful or reckless conduct.
40. It may well be that few modem courts would deny recovery as a matter of
law in an open elevator shaft case. See discussion of Jackson v. Velveray Corp.
supra note 6. See also Scottish Rite Supreme Council v. Jacobs, 266 F.2d 675 (D.C.
Cir. 1959).
41. See generally James, The Nature of Negligence, 3 UTA- L. REv. 275, 279-86
(1953).
42. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 342 (1965). The duty owed to licensees
rests, of course, upon knowledge of their presence or upon the presence of facts
which would put a reasonable man on notice as to their presence. Under the reasoning
suggested here, however, even though the presence of the fireman is unknown or unforeseen, the jury might still find negligence if the condition was suffciently dangerous
to any class of persons where presence could be reasonably anticipated in close proximity
to the condition.
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only for failure to exercise reasonable care, and would have available
43
the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk.
Concededly, the ideas here expressed would require most cases
to be sent to the jury, with the likely consequence that there would
be more judgments for the plaintiff. However this may be, it is
clear that proper results can be reached only by analyzing individual
cases in terms of narrow distinctions rather than in broad classifications which perhaps bespeak more than anything else a grudging
reluctance to further erode traditional immunities.
Although no cases were found in which the courts have expressly
done so, it is submitted that another exception needs to be grafted
on the general rule that firemen and policemen are licensees except

while on parts of the premises held open to the public. 45 Commercial

and industrial premises, and certain multiple family dwellings, are
customarily required, by statute or otherwise, to maintain points
of access other than public entrances for use by firemen on emergency
calls. The fireman entering by such access should be safe in assuming that it has been maintained in a reasonably safe condition.
Thus, while a fireman who enters the basement of a private dwelling
may be required to take the premises as he finds them, one who
ascends a ladder to an upper window in a warehouse which has been
marked for use in emergencies should be able to assume that he
will not step onto a floor immediately inside that is too weak to
support his weight.46 The question of course arises as to how far
into the building the defendant's duty should extend. While an
answer definite in terms of space is impossible to formulate, it would
not seem unreasonable to extend the duty to those parts of the
premises, such as aisles and passageways which are adjacent to the
43. Cases may arise in which the injury is sustained because the fireman is blinded
by smoke or is otherwise distracted by the fire and fails to exercise the care he
might otherwise have taken. This may present a question of proximate cause, in
addition to the question of reasonable care, and should normally be for the jury. Cf.
Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J. 270, 157 A.2d 129 (1960), where a fireman was denied
recovery when be stepped off an inside balcony in a building under construction.
There was no guard rail and the fireman's vision was obscured by smoke.
It is obvious that professional firemen assume a high degree of risk in connection
with their employment. However, the courts have in several cases drawn a distinction
between the risks inherent in fighting fires and unusual hazards not reasonably foreseeable. There is clearly developing an attitude to permit recovery for injuries
involving the latter situation. See, e.g., Mistelske v. Kravco, Inc., supra note 1; Jackson
v. Velveray Corp., supra note 6.
44. James, supranote 18, at 68.
45. See note 12 supra; RlESTATEMENT (SECOND), Tonrs § 345 (1965).
46. The rationale underlying the occupier's duty would be analagous to that applied
in the preceding discussion of public premises and other parts of premises in which the
occupier owes a duty to some class of persons. The fireman should be entitled to
assume that the place of designated access is reasonably safe for his use. Id., § 345,
comment e.
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point of entry, and over which it is foreseeable that the fireman
will move in finding his bearings in unfamiliar surroundings. There
would in no case be imposed any greater duty than reasonable
care, either to make safe or to make obvious, 47 and the defendant
would have available the defenses of independent intervening cause
-such as dangers created by smoke or fire, contributory negligence,
and assumption of risk. 48 In this context the occupier's duty would
go directly to the fireman irrespective of a duty owed to others,
even though the element of foreseeability might be incapable of
more precise definition than is embodied in the phrase "in case of
fire." As the plaintiff moved away from the place of entry, however,
he would enter sections of the premises in which any duty to him
would need to be determined in light of the duty owed to others,
as has been previously discussed. It is readily conceded that this
approach to the question of the occupier's duty would require close
supervision by the courts, and that in the absence of such supervision juries might well be unable to deal effectively with the narrow
distinctions suggested. However, the court could normally effect the
proper supervision by careful instructions concerning the occupier's
duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain fire entrances and
adjacent areas in a reasonably safe condition, and by further instructions concerning the possible duty existing toward other persons
if the injury actually occurred in another area of the premises.
Despite the practical difficulties involved in any move toward emphasizing justice in the individual case, it is urged that the courts
should be willing to assume the greater burden inherent in the more
tightly reasoned approach.49
47. Id., §§ 343, 343A. The Restatement provides that there is no liability to an
invitee for physical harm caused them by activities or conditions on the land whose
danger is known or obvious to him, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm
despite the knowledge or obviousness. In an area apparently maide safe for firemen
entering in an emergency, this principle should be applied, not as it would be in
situations in which the attention of a casual observer might be distracted from an
otherwise obvious danger, but to more serious conditions where the total appearance
of the place effectively diverts the plaintiff's attention from a danger which would
be obvious if he were permitted an opportunity for more leisurely observation.
48. See notes 42 supra & 56 infra and accompanying text. The majority rule clearly
is that firemen may not recover for injuries caused by the foreseeable hazards created
by fire.
49. See generally James, supra note 18, at 676-78. "The other main job confronting
the tribunal as a whole in accident cases is to evaluate the conduct of the parties, in the
light of the circumstances, in terms of its legal consequences. . . .It alone determines
what the broad rules of substantive law are, and which ones may be applicable to
the case at band ..... But each case also involves a more specific evaluation of the
conduct in the concrete situation with which it deals; a determination of specific
standards of conduct for the parties under the circumstances of the actual case.....
Now it is perfectly clear that rules of law could be so formulated and so administered
as to exclude the jury from making these evaluations." Id. at 676.
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B. DangerousActivities

The occupier owes to the fireman and policeman a duty to carry on
his activities with reasonable care so as not to injure him, subject to
the responsibility imposed upon the officer to be alert for his own
safety.50 There is little authority on this question. In one case a
policeman was held to be more than a licensee when he went upon
railroad premises in pursuit of a suspected criminal and was killed
when hit by a train. 51 Generally, the fireman or policeman would
seem to be in the same position as any other licensee when he enters
the premises with the knowledge of the occupier, insofar as the
occupier's activities are concerned. 2 Moreover, he will be considered
an invitee while on parts of the premises "then held open to the
public."53 In regard to activities, such as the operation of machinery,

which are carried on in remote parts of the premises away from the
surveillance of the occupier, much the same reasoning previously
advanced in connection with dangerous conditions would apply. It
may be that in many, if not most, situations the occupier will be
represented at or near operating machinery by an employee who
would be responsible for giving suitable warning or taking other
reasonable steps to avoid injury to firemen and policemen. Where
there is no representative present, it would not seem unreasonable to
require that dangerous operations be made known by signs, lights, or
other suitable means. The same factors of foreseeability should be
weighed in assessing the danger of an activity, and the same considerations with regard to the inconvenience of providing safeguards
should be weighed in establishing the occupier's duty to make it
safe.
The degree of danger from an activity may be so great as to bring it
within the category of nuisance. The best illustration of this principle
is perhaps a situation involving blasting. In one case, a policeman
who was a veteran supervisor of blasting operations was killed while
on assignment to supervise quarry blasting on premises with which
he was familiar. The court allowed recovery on the ground that the
operation was a nuisance, and it was not necessary to prove negligence
on the part of the occupier in order to impose liability.5
50. RESTATEmE
(SECOND), TORTS § 341 (1965).
51. Ryan v. Chicago &. N. W. Ry., 314 I1. App. 65, 42 N.E.2d 128 (1943).
52. The occupier is apparently held to the same standard of care applicable in
general negligence cases insofar as his activities and known licensees or invitees are
concerned. REsTATmENT (SECOND), TORTS §§ 341, 341A (1965).
53. Id. § 345.
54. Starkel v. Edward Ball Co., 142 Conn. 336, 114 A.2d 199 (1955). See also
Cameron v. Kenyon-Connell Commercial Co., 22 Mont. 312, 56 Pac. 358 (1899) (firemen killed by powder explosion where defendants had stored greater quantity of the
explosive than permitted by statute).
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C. Negligent Maintenanceof Premises
It is with reference to the negligent maintenance of the premises,
which makes fire more likely to occur, that the fireman faces his most
formidable resistance to recovery. With rare exception, even the most
liberal courts deny liability for such negligence.5 5 This general rule
appears to be sound. The fact that the occupier's negligence in allowing a fire hazard to develop may be the direct cause of the plaintiff's
injury does not obviate the basic consideration that the foreseeability
of such negligence is one of the reasons why the plaintiff's job exists.The decisions were unanimous on this point until 1960. In that year
57
the Supreme Court of Illinois decided the case of Dini v. Naiditch,
in which firemen were allowed to recover, both on common law negligence grounds and on a finding of statutory violation, for injuries
and death suffered while fighting a fire in a hotel in which the
operator had been negligent in maintaining fire safety standards. The
court did not expressly classify the plaintiffs as invitees, but it clearly
implied that they were such in its rejection of the general rule that
they are licensees, 58 and in its holding that the defendants owed a
duty of care to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition
to prevent fire from which it was foreseeable that injury and loss of
life would result. The decision has generally been interpreted to mean
that a fireman may recover from the occupier who negligently allows
a fire to occur which in turn is the proximate cause of the fireman's
injury. While Dean Prosser has expressed his approval of Dini,5 9 it
has not been followed in the few cases which have subsequently arisen
in other jurisdictions. 60 It thus appears that the general rule is well
entrenched, and from language in recent opinions it would appear
likely to remain so. It may well be, however, that a case as appealing
55. Aravanis v. Eisenberg, 237 Md. 242, 206 A.2d 148 (1965); Buren v. Midwest
Indus., Inc., supra note 6; Krauth v. Geller, supra note 43; Jackson v. Velveray Corp.,
supra note 6.
56. Krauth v. Geller, supra note 43, at 274, 157 A.2d at 131: "Probably most fires
are attributable to negligence, and in the final analysis the policy decision is that it
would be too burdensome to charge all who carelessly cause or fail to prevent fires
with the injuries suffered by the expert retained with public funds to deal with those
inevitable, although negligently created, occurrences. Hence, for that risk, the fireman
should receive appropriate compensation from the public he serves, both in pay which
reflects the hazard and in workmen's compensation benefits for the consequences of
the inherent risks of the calling."
57. 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960).
58. Id. at 415, 170. N.E.2d at 885: "In reviewing the law on this issue, we note
further that this legal fiction that firemen are licensees to whom no duty of reasonable
care is owed is without any logical foundation."
59. PnossEn § 61, at 407.
60. Aravanis v. Eisenberg, supra note 55; Buren v. Midwest Indus., 380 S.W.2d 96
(Ky. App. 1964); Jackson v. Velveray Corp., 82 N.J. Super. 469, 198 A.2d 115
(App. Div. 1964).
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on its facts as Dini would persuade another jurisdiction to follow
Illinois' lead. The image of the operator of a hotel who allows such
a state of disrepair to develop that it appears he is indifferent to the
danger in which he places his paying guests, let alone public officials, is
not the same as that of an occupier who, albeit negligent in a given
situation, may not present so gross a picture.
D. Unusually Dangerous Substances or Conditions Which Have
Either Causedthe Fire or Are Made More Dangerousby the Fire.
Closely parallel to the cases which hold that firemen and policemen
are owed a duty of warning of unusually dangerous conditions not
connected with fires are the cases which permit recovery for injuries
due to unusually dangerous agencies and conditions which may have
been aggravated by the fire. In fact, the law is perhaps more fully
developed on this latter point than on the former, since some jurisdictions apparently allow recovery in the one but not in the other. 61
The justification for allowing recovery under such circumstances is
that, while firemen assume the risks inevitably present in their occupation, they do not assume risks of unusual hazards, most frequently
of an explosive nature, which are not reasonably to be anticipated
in the place where they are fighting the fire. 62 The general duty of
the occupier is to issue a warning of such hazards if he realizes the
risk involved and has opportunity to warn. 63 Firemen are still required
to assess the situation in which they find themselves, however, and
may not be entitled to a warning in circumstances where they should
anticipate the danger or where they can actually see it. Thus, presence
of gasoline in a basement in which fire has broken out and an explosion
has occurred may constitute an unusual hazard concerning which the
occupier is under a duty to warn if he has opportunity to do so.64
On the other hand, firemen who are called to combat a fire at a garage
may be held to have assumed the risk of a gasoline explosion because
61. Compare Bartel's v. Continental Oil Co., 384 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. 1964), wtith
Anderson v. Cinnamon, supra note 20.
62. This line of reasoning was approved in Aravanis v. Eisenberg, supra noto 55;
Buren v. Midwest Indus., supra note 60; Krauth v. Geller, supra note 43; Campbell v.
Pure Oil Co., 194 Adt. 873 (N.J. 1937); Jackson v. Velveray Corp., supra note 60;
Lamb v. Sebach, 52 Ohio App. 362, 3 N.E.2d 686 (1935).
63. Aravanis v. Eisenberg, supra note 55; Bartel's v. Continental Oil Co., supra
note 61; See generally RESTATEMENT (SF-coND), TORTs § 342 (1965).
64. Jenkins v. 313-321 W. 37th St. Corp., 284 N.Y. 397, 31 N.E.2d 503 (1940).
Compare Rogers v. Cato Oil & Grease Co., 396 P.2d 1000 (Okla. 1964) (fireman denied
recovery for injuries sustained when stacked oil drums fell, spilling burning oil on him,
court held that the peril was open and obvious to the plaintiff) and Bennett v.
Kurland, 21 Pa. D. & C. 2d 587 (C.P. 1959) (fireman denied recovery on grounds
of assumption of risk for injuries caused by gas leaking from an old refrigerator, he
had been called to investigate the leak).
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storage of the fuel is commonplace in garages.6 It is apparent that
many fires on premises will involve both the hazards inherent in any
fire plus unusual hazards not reasonably foreseeable. In cases where
these two classes of perils may be separately and distinctly identified,
the occupier's duty to warn of the unusual hazard will not contravene
the general rule of assumption of risk of ordinary hazards. Thus,
where a fire is being fought at a petroleum storage facility, there will
be numerous hazards which a fireman must anticipate as best he
can. If, however, a storage tank is equipped with safety valves too
small to allow the heat-expanded gases inside to escape, the fireman
may be owed a warning of the possibility that the tank might leave
its moorings and rocket. 66 Other cases may arise in which the separation of usual hazards from unusual hazards for purposes of analysis
would be a difficult task. A close question may exist as to whether
the presence of the substance which proved to be extra-hazardous
was to be anticipated under the circumstances, this determination
of course being the key to the general rule of assumption of risk for
firemen.6 A more subtle distinction is required in cases in which the
presence of the dangerous substance is not to be anticipated, but
in which it is present and actually creates the fire but does not give
rise to any further danger, such as unexpected flashing or explosion.
Here, under the general rule, logic would seem to require a holding
of non-liability on the ground of assumption of risk, even assuming the
occupier's negligence in storing the inflammable substance. 68 If, however, there is explosion or flashing, the occupier may be liable for
injuries suffered thereby if he has failed to issue a warning.
The foregoing discussion describes the general approach of the
courts to the question of unusual hazards in connection with fires.
However, this line of reasoning has been developed in the main from
factual situations in which the occupier or his agents were present
65. Gannon v. Royal Properties, 285 App. Div. 131, 136 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1st Dep't).

aff'd, 309 N.Y. 819, 130 N.E. 2d 616 (1954).
66. This was the situation in Bartel's v. Continental Oil Co., supra note 61. Here
the fireman was outside the premises at the time of the explosion.

The court based

its holding on the ground that he was owed a warning of the unusually dangerous
condition, and made determination of his status as an invitee or licensee. It appears
reasonably certain that the court would have reached the same result if the fireman
had been on the premises at the time of the accident.
67. This was the situation in Gannon v. Royal Properties, supra note 65. See also
Jackson v. Velveray Corp., supra note 60, in which the court stated that this question
is normally for the jury.
68. No cases were found in which it was necessary for the court to rule on this
precise question. However, the doctrine of Dini v. Naiditch, supra note 57, would
apparently allow recovery in this situation. See note 60 supra and accompanying text,
for discussion of the attitude of most courts on this issue. It would seem that the
jury would be entitled to decide close questions concerning whether the injury was
caused by normal fire danger or unex-pected flashing, etc.
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at the time of the accident and at least arguably had an opportunity
to issue a verbal warning.6 9 Where they were present, the duty to
warn was quite properly imposed. However, if the occupier's duty
is only to warn, as the cases have frequently stated,70 in the occupier's
absence there could be no recovery unless the duty to warn could

be said to include the posting of a warning sign or device. Since
there is a clear relationship between the duty to warn and the
foreseeability of harm from the hazard, 71 an evaluation of this factor
in a case where the occupier was absent might indicate that a sign
or other device should have been provided. Of course, in most cases
where the occupier is present, the warning closely follows the realization of peril, and the probability of harm may be measured in

minutes. In the example of the undersize vents in oil storage tanks,
serious harm in the event of fire is highly foreseeable and the
occupier might well be required to warn by means of signs or other
devices even if he was not present during a fire. 72 Possible support
for the idea that the courts will not restrict the duty of occupiers to
the giving of a warning can be found in at least three recent decisions.
In these cases the courts alluded to the "negligence" of the defendant
in allowing the allegedly unusual hazard which caused the injury to

exist.73 True, the courts may have used the term "negligence" in the
69. E.g., Aravanis v. Eisenberg, supra note 55; Bartel's v. Continental Oil Co.,
supra note 61; Jackson v. Velveray Corp., supra note 60; Jenkins v. 313-321 W. 37th
St. Corp., supra note 64; Lamb v. Sebach, supra note 62.
70. Ibid.
71. The cases cited in note 69 supra contain extended discussions of this principle
and hold it to be fully applicable in firemen cases. It derives from the general rules
concerning licensees and invitees expressed in the Restatement. RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), TORTs §§ 342, 343 (1965).

72. Bartel's v. Continental Oil Co., supra note 61; Lamb v. Sebach, supra note 62,
In these cases, however, the question did not arise because the occupiers or their
agents were present and had opportunity to warn of the danger.
73. See, e.g., Aravanis v. Eisenberg, supra note 55, at 248-50, 206 A.2d at 154-56.
In this case the occupier had stored an explosive chemical in a container which he
accidentally tipped over, starting the fire. In the plaintiff-fireman's action for injuries
suffered when the residue of the chemical in the container flashed, the court charged the
jury in part to the effect that, if they found that because of the defendant's negligence
there existed a danger greater than that which is normally to be found in a private
dwelling, he would be under a duty to warn the plaintiff of that danger. Jackson v,
Velveray Corp., supra note 60. In reviewing the proceeding in the trial court, the
court cited and relied upon Krauth v. Geller, supra note 43, for the proposition that
occupiers are subject to liability for their negligence in connection with conditions
creating undue risks of injury. Further, in reinstating the jury's verdict for the defendant, the court held that they could have resolved the question of defendant's negligence
in storing chemicals in his favor from the evidence in the record. Presumably they
might also have resolved the question against him. Buren v. Midwest Indus., Inc., 380
S.W.2d 96 (Ky. App. 1964), in which the court suggested that the presence of
explosives may give rise to liability either on the basis of an unusual hidden hazard
or of continuing active negligence. In this case the court affirmed a judgment entered
notwithstanding the verdict for the defendant.
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sense that the defendant's conduct merely failed to comply with the
standard of care deemed reasonable under the circumstances, and
not in the sense that the defendant also violated a duty owed to the
plaintiff.?4 This reasoning would of course permit the duty to be
placed at a different level from the "negligent" conduct-specifically,
the giving of a personal warning if there is opportunity to do so.75
However, it is submitted that if the fireman is required to go upon the
premises at a time when the occupier is neither present nor represented, he should not be barred from recovery if in fact the occupier
has allowed to exist unannounced an unusually dangerous situation
which the fireman will probably not perceive, and from which it is
foreseeable that firemen will suffer serious injury or death in case
of fire.7 6 It is clear in some of the decisions that the courts were
w
guided by this reasoning, at least with reference to known hazards
Moreover, it is believed that in the cases in which the courts employed
the term "negligence" in the manner discussed earlier, recovery would
have been allowed despite the absence of the occupier or lack of
opportunity to warn.
There may be on the horizon yet a further extension of the
occupier's duty, to include the exercise of reasonable care to discover
unusual hazards of the type presently under consideration. The duty
to discover is of course the essential element of the duty owed to
invitees in the law of landowners' liability.78 A recent decision by a
74. See PROSSER § 30, at 146-47.
75. See generally RESTATMENT (SECOND), TORTS §§ 281, 282 (1965).
76. The occupier's duty in this situation should be determined with reference to
the likelihood of danger in the event of fire. The jury should normally be permitted
to decide the question of reasonable care, as well as the question whether the injury
was caused by a hazard which should have been anticipated by the plaintiff. See
notes 62-65 supra and accompanying text.
77. Campbell v. Pure Oil Co., 15 N.J. Misc. 723, 194 Atl. 873 (1937), involved
firemen injured while outside premises by explosion allegedly caused in part by
defendant's negligence in permitting large quantities of oily, greasy, and gaseous
substances of a highly inflammable nature to accumulate. It was not shown that the
defendant was present or represented at the time, and the court did not mention this
as a prerequisite to a finding of liability. The case came up on appeal from a denial
by the trial court of defendant's motion to strike the complaint. The denial was
affirmed. See also Maloney v. Hearst Hotels Corp., 274 N.Y. 106, 8 N.E.2d 296
(1937) (recovery by fireman affirmed; death was caused by explosion of paint and
chemical compounds stored contrary to city ordinance; holding was based entirely
on this ground, with the court expressly reserving the question of common law liability);
Cf. Bandosz v. Daigger & Co., 255 Ill. App. 494 (1930) (defendant's storage of
flamable liquids in quantities exceeding amount permitted by city ordinance termed
wilful and wanton misconduct). Texas Cities Gas Co. v. Dickens, 136 S.W.2d 1010
(Tex. Civ. App. 1949) (utility company, not the occupier, sued by firemen for failure
to turn off gas to burning building, thus creating increased hazard); Houston Belt &
Terminal Ry. Co. v. O'Leary, 136 S.W. 601 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) (fireman killed
by explosion of fireworks in boxcar held to be licensee, but entitled not to be injured
through defendant's "active negligence").
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 343 (1965).
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Maryland court appears to set the stage for this kind of recovery,
although in that case there was a jury verdict for the defendant. 9
The court suggested without deciding that, just as an invitee may
exceed the scope of his invitation and thereby become a licensee.
one in the position of a fireman may make the transition from
licensee to invitee if he is faced with an unusual hazard created by
the occupier's negligence. 80 Following this line of analysis, the court
approved the trial court's charge to the jury that if, after meeting the
ordinary risk inevitable in fighting fires in private dwellings, the
fireman was faced with an unusual danger created by the negligence 8'
of the occupier, and of which he knew, or should have knowvn,8
the fireman was entitled to be warned of such danger. In
further outlining the steps in the trial court's instructions, the court
approved the trial court's summary that if the defendant had
stored an inflammable liquid under circumstances in which he knew
or in the exercise of reasonable care would have known that his acts
would probably result in injury in the event of fire, and if the danger
created was unusual and not ordinarily to be expected in defendant's
home, then the jury could find that he was negligent and their
verdict should be for the plaintiff. The court held that this charge
was as favorable to the plaintiff as the facts would allow, and refused
to upset the jury's verdict for the defendant. It appeared that the
defendant was present when the fireman was injured and had full
knowledge of the presence of the chemical. The appellate court's
decision does not disclose the ground upon which the jury's verdict
for the defendant was based. In the face of the jury's verdict, one
may perhaps feel emboldened to advocate the proposition that any
such case should be given to the jury, and that the duty to exercise
reasonable care to discover extraordinarily dangerous agencies or
substances can be imposed with discretion.83 As in the earlier discussion
79. Aravanis v. Eisenberg, supra note 55.
80. Id. at 154.
81. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
82. It is unclear whether the court, in allowing the jury to find a duty to discover
the hazard, was referring to discovery of its physical presence or to realization of its
potential harm. It would seem that since in this case the defendant was present
and apparently knew of the presence of the chemical (he had been using it just prior
to the fire), the trial court may have been referring to knowledge of its explosive characteristics. If this he true, the defendant's duty would seem to be the same as is
owed to licensees, i.e., he would have "had reason to know" of the dangerous
propensities of the chemical and should have given warning. RESTATEMENT (SECOND),

ToRTs § 342 (1965). On the other hand, the duty to discover the presence of the
hazard may be greater in its burden on the occupier, and may be the same as the
typical duty owed to invitees.
83. No suggestion is made that the statistics cited by Professor James do not provide
a reasonably accurate estimate of the long run results of allowing firemen cases to go
to the jury. James, The Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 YALE
L.J. 667, 687 (1949).
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of unusual dangers not connected with fireM the objective should be
to require the occupier to be reasonably careful in the handling of
the inordinately dangerous situation. In a given case, the utility of a
highly dangerous situation may justify the occupier in retaining it with
a suitable sign or other device installed as a warning. Again, where
the utility of the condition would be unaffected by a relatively inexpensive effort to make it reasonably safe, a warning might be
insufficient if it were foreseeable that the fireman would either not
receive the warning, or would be unable to react in time to avoid
injury, or would be reasonably compelled by his duty to proceed into
the danger zone despite the warning. 5 The determination of a case
would of necessity rest on a close analysis of the facts rather than on
broad concepts of duty owed to traditional classes of persons.
III. LIABILrrY

BASED ON FAULT AND PUBLIC COMPENSATION

As discussed earlier, one important reason behind the courts' reluctance to allow recovery in firemen and policemen cases is the fear
that to require occupiers to anticipate their presence in all parts of the
86
premises would create an undue inhibition upon use of their land.
There is another reason. The argument is that public fire and police
departments exist to deal with the emergencies which inevitably arise
in modem society. Their service is to the public in a primary sense,
even when they are rendering aid upon the private property of an
individual. Their efforts, including the risks of personal harm which
they assume, inure to the benefit of all the people, and their compensation, including compensation for injury and death in the line of
duty, should come from public funds.87 This argument cannot be
84. See notes 28-44 supra and accompanying text.

85. This level of duty may be owed to invitees under
ToRTs § 343A (1965).

RESTATEMNT

(SEcOND),

By effecting a balance between utility, expense of correction,

and foreseeability of harm, the imposition of this duty with reference to firemen would
not be burdensome.
86. The dangers involved in allowing recovery have also been variously expressed
with reference to different factual situations. Thus, in Anderson v. Cinnamon, 365 Mo.
304, 309, 282 S.W.2d 445, 448 (1955), the court held that the occupier was under no
duty to warn a fireman of a defective porch because "it would also be likely to
interfere with the operations of the firemen in fighting the fire for a possessor to
undertake to tell them where to go and where not to go." Dean Prosser has termed
as "preposterous rubbish" the argument that potential tort liability to firemen would
deter an occupier from sounding the alarm in case of fire. PnossER § 61, at 407.
87. This view is set out and approved in Scheuer v. Trustees of Open Bible Church,
175 Ohio St. 163, 170, 192 N.E.2d 38, 46 (1963): "It appears to be the sound and
settled public policy in this state that the problem should be handled [by compensating
injured public officers from a system of workmen's compensation], and it has seldom
if ever been challenged in the General Assembly by policemen and firemen and
their organizations. As a matter of fact, their approach to the problem has been
through the Workmen's Compensation Act."
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gainsaid insofar as it pertains to the usual risks inherent in their
occupations. The only valid rebuttal exists with reference to those
hazards which are not normally associated with the risks of their
calling. In such cases, firemen and policemen should not be penalized
because of their occupations, neither should all the people be expected
to bear the burden created by the negligent acts or omissions of a
few.88 Even though the liability of occupiers be established along the
lines herein suggested, there will remain a wide range of circumstances in which the fireman and policeman will have no compensation
for injuries except that provided by the public.
IV.

LiArr.mrr

BASED ON VIOLATION OF STATUTES

In many of the fireman and policeman cases, plaintiffs' counsel have

been properly alert to the possibility of basing the occupier's liability
upon some statute or ordinance, usually one which prescribes standards for the storage of dangerous substances,"9 or for the maintenance
of other safety standards.90 The courts are faced with a multi-faceted
problem in such cases.91 Among them there is obviously the question
of whether the statute covers the factual situation before the court.
Where this can be decided in the negative, no further consideration
will be given the statute as a primary ground of liability. 2 Where the
statute does cover the situation, the courts generally attempt to decide
whether the plaintiff is among the class of persons for whose benefit
the statute was enacted. The early cases usually involved statutes
pertaining to conditions on the premises such as elevator shafts, fire
escapes, and the like, and they were construed conservatively by the

courts.93 In later cases, there has appeared a greater willingness to

find the plaintiff to be within the protection of statutes pertaining
88. Id. at 46. In his dissent, Gibson, J. pointed out that a fireman or policeman
who is injured by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle can maintain an action
against the tortfeasor, workmen's compensation notwithstanding.
89. E.g., Buren v. Midwest Industries, Inc., supra note 73; Rogers v. Cato Oil &
Grease Co., supra note 64.
90. E.g., Carroll v. Hemenway, 315 Mass. 45, 51 N.E.2d 952 (1943) (action based

in part on alleged violation of statute pertaining to elevator shafts); Davy v. Greenlaw,
101 N.H. 134, 135 A.2d 900 (1957)

(action based in part on alleged violation of

statute requiring maintenance of adequate fire escapes).
91. See generally James, Statutory Standards & Negligence in Accident Cases, 11
LA. L. RFv. 95 (1950).
92. Rogers v. Cato Oil & Grease Co., supra note 64; Beendenberder v. Midtown
Properties, Inc., 4 App. Div. 2d 276, 164 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1st Dep't 1957).
93. See, e.g., denying liability, Litch v. White, 160 Cal. 497, 117 Pac. 515 (1911);
Hamilton v. Minneapolis Desk Mfg. Co., 78 Minn. 3, 80 N.W. 693 (1899); Kelly v.
Henry Muks Co., 71 N.J.L. 358, 59 Ad. 23 (1904). See also, all allowing recovery,
Racine v. Morris, 136 App. Div. 467, 121 N.Y.S. 146, (1st Dep't) afJ'd, 201 N.Y. 240,
94 N.E. 864 (1911); Drake v. Fenton, 237 Pa. 8, 85 Ad. 14 (1912).
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to specific hazards such as storage of chemicals, but the case law on
the point remains sparse.94 Insofar as general fire safety statutes are
concerned, Dini v. Naiditch9 apparently stands alone among recent
authorities in allowing recovery based on failure to maintain a general
level of housekeeping consistent with the requirements of a statute. 96

This type of situation presents to the courts a subtle policy choice.
The language of a statute pertaining to general fire safety standards
may be as susceptible of interpretation to include firemen as a statute
pertaining to dangerous conditions such as elevator shafts. 97 The court
is therefore faced with choosing a policy to be furthered as a basis
for its holding on the statute itself. Where the legislature has not
clearly directed the statute to the protection of firemen, 98 it would
seem more consistent with the general view of assumption of the risk
of ordinary hazards to hold that the statute does not include firemen
within its protection, at least insofar as it does not purport to establish
standards with reference to extra-hazardous things such as explosives.
In regard to the latter concept, public policy would tend to favor a
more liberal construction with reference to firemen, as has been seen.99
A liberal policy of statutory construction should also be employed
with reference to statutes establishing standards for guarding of elevator shafts, fire escapes, and the like, as well as for safety appliance
94. Thus, in Aravanis v. Eisenberg, supra note 55, the trial court charged the jury
that if they found that the defendant had violated a statute pertaining to the storage
and handling of volatile chemicals, and if they further found that the violation was a
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, he would be entitled to recover. The jury's
verdict was for the defendant. Again, in Maloney v. Hearst Hotels Corp., supra note
77, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment for a fireman who was
killed by an explosion of paint and chemical compounds which had been stored by
the defendant contrary to a city ordinance. The affirmance was based entirely on the
statute, the court holding that the statute was enacted for the benefit of firemen as
well as guests in the hotel.
95. 20 Ill.
2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960).
96. In Buren v. Midwest Indus., Inc., supra note 73, the court stated that fire
ordinances are for the protection of all who in their rightful pursuits are affected
"involuntarily" by a fire, and refused to follow Dini.
97. In Dini the court relied upon the language of the fire safety statute that it was
"intended to prevent a disastrous fire or loss of life in case of fire . . ." to demonstrate
that firemen were within its coverage, Dini v. Naiditch, supra note 95, at 418, 170
N.E.2d at 886.
98. For a statute which expressly creates a civil cause of action for firemen under
certain circumstances, see N.Y. Musrtc. LAw § 205A. The New York courts apparently
administer this statute somewhat conservatively insofar as requiring it to be specifically
asserted and pleaded is concerned. Sicolo v. Prudential Savings Bank, 2 Misc. 2d 889,
151 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Sup. Ct. 1956), aff'd, 4 App. Div. 790, 165 N.Y.S.2d 222 (2d Dep't
1957), reo'd on other grounds, 5 N.Y.2d 254, 157 N.E.2d 284, 184 N.Y.S.2d 100
(1959). However, firemen bringing an action under the statute need not prove
freedom from contributory negligence, and assumption of risk is not a defense.
Carroll v. Pellicio Bros., Inc., 44 Misc. 2d 832, 255 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1964).
99. See notes 61-85 supra and accompanying text.
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regulations for machinery. 10 0 There appears to be no sound reason
why the fireman's or policeman's work should necessarily preclude his
being included in the protection which the legislature has required
the occupier to provide with reference to conditions unrelated to
dangers created directly by fire.
Even though firemen and policemen be within the class of persons
intended to be protected by a statute, there may be further obstacles
to its use as the sole basis for liability. For example, the injury
involved may not have been within the intendment of the statute.
A thorough inquiry into this matter is not within the scope of this
note, but it is submitted that a reasonably broad construction should
be given. Thus, it should make no difference, absent an express
declaration or clear implication to the contrary in the statute, that the
plaintiff injured on a defective fire escape was a policeman in pursuit
of a burglar rather than a fireman investigating a blaze. 10 1 Again, the
court must deal with the relationship between the statutory standard
and the standard of care which appears reasonable under the facts of
the case. It is urged that in most cases there should be no diminution
of the standard simply because the plaintiff is a fireman or policeman.
The prima facie negligence rule adopted by the Restatement
Second
02
appears to be the best reasoned approach to the problem.
V. INsPECroRs AND OT=ER PUBLIC EMPLOYEES

Like firemen and policemen, inspectors and other public employees
frequently enter the premises pursuant to a privilege conferred by
law and irrespective of the consent of the occupier.0 3 Unlike firemen
and policemen, however, the courts have generally held them to be
invitees.0 4 It is obvious that at least one of the obstacles to classifying
firemen and policemen as invitees will frequently not be present in the
case of inspectors and other public employees. While the presence
of members of the former group on emergency calls is not reasonably
100. Of course, if the language of the statute specifies the exclusive class or classes of
persons intended to be benefited by its terms, the court cannot force an interpretation

to include firemen or policemen.

Thus, a statute may declare itself to be for the

benefit of employees, or of guests in the case of public accommodations.

101. Davy v. Greenlaw, 101 N.H. 134, 135 A.2d 900 (1957). In this case it did not
appear that the court would have found even a fireman to be within the statutory
class.

102. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND),
103. Id., § 345.

ToRTS §§

286-288C (1965).

104. See PnossER § 61, at 405-06. "Where it can be found that the public employee

comes for a purpose which has some connection with business transacted on the
premises by the occupier, he is almost invariably treated as an invitee."

Id. at 406.

But see Mulcrone v. Wagner, 212 Minn. 478, 4 N.W.2d 97 (1942) (fire inspector
who slipped on defective stairway held to be licensee, following general rule that firemen are licensees.

situations).

Court refused to distinguish firemen cases involving emergency
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foreseeable in most instances, members of the latter are more likely
to enter during regular business hours, and to confine their visits to
more predictable portions of the premises. Thus, the imposition upon
the occupier of the duty owed to invitees works no unjust hardship,
as the courts have feared would be the case in connection with
firemen and policemen. 05
Since the courts have established a pattern of viewing inspectors
as invitees, most of the cases have been concerned with the standard
of care required and the defenses available to the defendant. General
principles of negligence are followed.'06 A number of cases have
involved plaintiffs who were permanently stationed on the premises,
and the courts have tended to evaluate the duty as being to provide
a safe place to work.' 7 In other cases where the plaintiffs have been
visitors on the premises, the courts have treated them as they would
ordinary business visitors. °8 The scope of the invitation has apparently not been at issue in most cases. 0 9 Certainly, it would seem that
105. See note 5 supra.
106. See generally James, The Nature of Negligence, 3 UTAH L. REV. 275 (1953).
107. E.g., Swift & Co. v. Schuster, 192 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1951) (similar facts
decided in same way under Utah law); Cudahy Packing Co. v. McBride, 92 F.2d
737 (8th Cir. 1937) (meat inspector allowed to recover for injuries sustained when
he fell on a ladder which had been placed at a site on the premises where the stairs
were being repaired. Plaintiff was enroute from his office to the killing floor, and
apparently did not know of the availability of an alternative route); Miller v. Pacific
Constructors, Inc., 68 Cal. App. 2d 529, 157 P.2d 57 (1945) (federal inspector injured
while performing duties inside dam project when a bulkhead gave way due to insecure
fastening; court looked to terms of U.S. Government contract in holding that the
plaintiff was in the position of an invitee); Fred Howland, Inc. v. Morris, 143 Fla.
189, 196 So. 472 (1940) (city building inspector allowed to recover for injuries caused
by falling on defective scaffolding at construction site; the court stated that his position
was similar to that of a government meat inspector in a privately owned meat packing
plant); Storment v. Swift & Co., 5 Ill. App. 2d 417, 125 N.E.2d 697 (1955) (federal
meat inspector injured when he slipped on grease and fat on the killing floor where
he was engaged in carrying out his duties). The court held that the issue of liability
was for the jury, saying "It is apparent that the defendant company had a duty to
maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition; and conduct its operations in
a reasonably safe manner for the performance of the work of plaintiff, since his presence
and duties require him to be on the premises. . . . Knowledge of the working conditions which might involve some risk did not, as a matter of law, under the facts,
constitute contributory negligence." Id. at 422, 125 N.E.2d 699; Knight v. Swift &
Co., 338 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1960) (U.S. Government meat inspector allowed to
recover for injuries suffered by falling on a defective stairway, the condition of which
he was aware; court applied Illinois law).
108. Thus, in Jennings v. Industrial Paper Stock Co., 248 S.W.2d 43 (Mo. App.
1952), the plaintiff, a health inspector, who went into the furnace room without waiting
for a light to be provided and fell into a furnace pit, was barred from recovery on
the grounds of contributory negligence. See also Robey v. Keller, 114 F.2d 790 (4th
Cir. 1940) (local citizen who was in position of leadership in having new community
library constructed held to be invitee of contractor when she went upon the site for
purposes of inspection).
109. The question might be more appropriately expressed in terms of the extent to
which the plaintiff's duty requires him to move about the premises. It should arise
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the inspector has no real benefit from his status as invitee if, in the

area where his duty compels him to be, he loses that status." 0 On

the other hand, if the occupier must exercise reasonable care to make
the premises safe to receive a public employee whose purpose it is
to explore remote and private sections thereof, he may appear to be

in the same position which has caused the courts to refuse to classify
firemen as invitees under similar circumstances. It should be noted,
however, that an inspector's visit can normally be more easily
anticipated, both as to time and place."' Of course, in any appropriate
case, the jury should be allowed to determine whether the plaintiff
was indeed in the necessary exercise of his duty, and this factor
might well be determinative of the case. As to assumption of risk by
inspectors, there is perhaps some analogy to the fireman cases." 2 No
cases on the point were found, but it would seem that where
inspectors are required to evaluate the safety of some potentially
dangerous installation, such as electrical apparatus, they assume the
risk that it will be found unsafe." 3 Any other rule might involve the
occupier in an endless cycle of potential liability, unless he was in

a position to correct the danger himself." 4

There are other public employees whose duties require them to
visit private premises in an official capacity, but who may not enjoy
a broad privilege unrelated to the possessor's consent." 5 Thus, a
meter reader representing a public utility will normally be an invitee
while carrying out his normal duties, but his right to enter may
more frequently in the inspector cases than in the fireman cases, because the fireman's
duties may well require his presence anywhere, while the inspector would normally
need to visit only a limited, or at least pre-determined area. The issue was raised in
Cudahy Packing Co. v. McBride, supra note 107, but was resolved in favor of the
plaintiff. See generally 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 27.12, at 1485-86 (1956).
110. Probably few modem courts would allow this to happen under most circumstances. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 345, comment c (1965), adopts the view

that public inspectors, etc. may be invitees because their entry is for purposes closely
connected with the business of the occupier, and is not solely pursuant to a privilege
conferred by law.
111. As to reasonable care in connection with extra-hazardous conditions, the same
reasoning may be applied to inspectors as was applied to firemen and policemen. See
notes 38-43 supra.
112. See notes 55-60 supra and accompanying text.
113. Further analogy may be found in discussion of assumption of risk in connection with master and servant cases. See 2 HARPER & JAMES, TOnTS 21.4, at 1178-79.
114. Two qualifications should be made to this statement. There may be a distinction for this purpose between a repairman whose job is to correct defects, and the
public inspector who merely seeks to detect them. It is suggested, however, that the
distinction is unsubstantial for the purposes of this discussion. Again, it is conceded
that there may arise situations in which an unusual danger will exist, one that the
plaintiff would not reasonably foresee. There may be liability in such cases, and
there may be an analogy to the extra-hazardous situation in the firemen cases. See
notes 61-85 supra and accompanying text.
115. See note 110 supra.
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be characterized as contractual and therefore more analogous to the
business visitor situation than to entry as of right.1 6 Postmen delivering mail are also classified as invitees, but the occupier can refuse
them admittance under most circumstances." 7 Other miscellaneous
public employees are customarily treated as business visitors," 8 and
the liability of occupiers to them partakes of the general law concerning invitees. It therefore appears that the law is settled as to the
duty owed to public employees other than firemen and policemen,
and the imposition of the duty is fully justified on moral and legal
grounds." 9
VI. Occurnuis' LIABILITY TO PIERSONS WHO ENTER PURSUANT
TO A PRIVILEGE FOR THE PURPOSE OF SAVING PERSONS

oR PROPERTY FROM HARM
The remainder of this article will be directed toward an investigation of the duty of occupiers to persons who enter the premises under
a privilege of private necessity. The privilege arises generally under
circumstances in which persons or property on the premises are
in danger, or when entry upon the premises is reasonably necessary
to avoid some danger from without. 2 0 It exists irrespective of the
consent of the occupier, and has developed in the common law
primarily as a defense to actions for trespass by occupiers.' 2' The
privilege is conditional, and does not necessarily relieve the one entering under it from liability for actual damages inflicted by his entering or remaining on the premises from liability for trespass,' 2 but the
occupier may himself be liable to the entant if he resists the entry or
expels him in violation of his privilege.'2 3 For the purposes of this
inquiry, primary emphasis will be directed to the occupier's liability
for negligence, and not to the question of whether there exists a
116. Sheffield Co. v. Phillips, 69 Ga. App. 41, 24 S.E.2d 834 (1943). See also
Miller v. Pacific Constructors, Inc., supra note 107; Fred Howland, Inc. v. Morris,
supra note 107.
117. Paulbed v. Hitz, 339 Mo. 274, 96 S.W.2d 369 (1936).
118. Dillon v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 9 App. Div. 2d 835, 192 N.Y.S.2d 818 (3d
Dep't 1959) (sealer of weights and measures).
119. See generally Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 29 CoLum. L.
REv. 255, 270-75 (1929).

120. The extent of the privilege is defined in RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §
197 (1965). A similar privilege to enter premises exists in cases of public necessity.
Id., § 196; 1 HAnPER & JAMEs, TonTS §§ 1.16-1.22, at 46-64. See generally Bohlen,
Incomplete Privilege to Inflict Intentional Invasions of Property and Personality, 39
Hnv. L. REv. 307 (1925).
121. Ibid.
122. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910). But
see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS, § 197, comments e & j (1965).
123. Depue v. Flatou, 100 Minn. 299, 111 N.W. 1 (1907); Ploof v. Putman, 81 Vt.
471, 71 At. 188 (1908).
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privilege to enter under the facts. Therefore, except where noted to
the contrary, the plaintiff will be assumed not to be a trespasser.
A. Entry To Aid Persons or Property in Danger on Premises
The first aspect of occupiers' liability which will be considered in

this section involves what is frequently described as the doctrine of
rescue. Broadly stated, the doctrine imposes liability upon one who
by his negligence places persons or property in danger under circumstances in which it is foreseeable that another will be induced
1
to attempt a rescue, and the rescuer is injured in the attempt. 2
The concept is a general theory of negligence liability, and is not
limited to application in land occupier cases.'2 However, when
applied to such situations, it is apparent that the theory may furnish

the plaintiff with both a privilege to enter the premises and a theory
of negligence upon which to predicate the occupier's liability if he
126
suffers injury.
The duty of an occupier to one who attempts a rescue on his
premises may be viewed in two ways. First, the rescuer may be an
invitee or licensee on the premises in his own right, and may therefore be entitled to a level of duty commensurate with that status.'21
Liability for injuries suffered by such a person may well depend upon
whether the occupier has been negligent with reference to conditions
124. Walker Hauling Co. v. Johnson, 110 Ga. App. 620, 624, 139 S.E.2d 496, 499
(1964): "Where a defendant's negligent act, of commission or omission, has created a
condition or situation which involves urgent and imminent peril and danger, to life
or property, of himself or of others, those acts of negligence are also negligence in
relationship to all others who, in the exercise of ordinary care for their own safety,
under the circumstances, short of rashness and recklessness, may attempt, successfully
or otherwise, to rescue such endangered life or property, by any means reasonably
appropriate to the purpose; and insofar as the proximate cause of any injuries that a
rescuer sustains as a result of his efforts is concerned, the chain of causation remains
intact, since it is reasonably to be anticipated that, once such peril to life or property
is initiated and brought into being by the negligence of a defendant, reasonable
attempts will be undertaken to alleviate and nullify the consequences of such peril."
See Cardozo's expression of the doctrine in Wagner v. International Key Co., 232 N.Y.
176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921).
125. In modern cases, the concept is applied frequently to vehicle accident situations.
See, e.g., Woodruff v. Weis Butane Gas Co., 225 Ark. 114, 279 S.W.2d 564 (1955);
Guy v. Blanchard Funeral Home, 85 Ga. App. 823, 70 S.E.2d 117 (1952); Hammonds
v. Haven, 280 S.W.2d 814 (Mo. 1955).
126. Interestingly enough, no rescue cases were found in which it appeared that the
occupier was seeking damages for trespass against the plaintiff.
127. Obviously, in such a case the plaintiff's privilege to be on the premises might
derive primarily from the occupier's consent, although in the true rescue situation,
presumably the occupier could not withdraw his consent during the existence of the
emergency. For examples of cases in which the plaintiff was both invitee and rescuer,
see Grigsby v. Coastal Marine Serv., 235 F. Supp. 97 (W.D. La. 1964); Parnell v.
Security Elevator Co., 174 Kan. 643, 258 P.2d 288 (1953); Mitchell v. Pettigrea, 65
N.M. 137, 333 P.2d 879 (1958). In these cases, however, the defendants' liability
appeared to be based largely on the rescue theory.
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or activities on the premises, thereby creating a cause of action in the
28
plaintiff apart from any consideration of the rescue doctrine.
Secondly, the duty to a rescuer may be viewed as it relates directly
to the rescue doctrine, and this is the subject of central focus here.
It has already been indicated that in rescue cases the occupier's duty
to the rescuer has as a basic premise a duty to the one rescued.
Therefore, if the one rescued would not have a cause of action against
the occupier if he sustained injury from the danger, the rescuer will
have no cause of action.129 On the other hand, while it is generally
said that there must be negligence toward the one rescued in order
for there to be negligence toward the rescuer,130 the courts apparently
do not always specifically find that the occupier was negligent in
allowing the first party to be placed in peril before allowing the
rescuer to recover. 131 Moreover, the rescuer will not be barred from
recovery by the contributory negligence of the one rescued. 13 Neither
128. Cruetzemacher v. Billings, 348 S.W.2d 952 (Mo. 1961), where an occupier was
held not liable to woman who ran onto premises to rescue child from possible injury,
and was injured when she cut through a flower bed and fell over a post upon exiting
the premises. Regardless of plaintiff's status while effecting the rescue, she became no
more than a licensee when she went into the flower bed. It might also be argued
in such a case that the occupier's negligence toward the one rescued was not the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.
129. Thus, where two licensees are on the same land together, and one encounters a
dangerous condition concerning which the occupier owes him no duty, the other will
not be able to recover against the occupier for injuries sustained in an attempt to
rescue his friend. Brady v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 265 Wis. 618, 62 N.W.2d 415 (1954)
(two children killed when they fell from a railroad bridge into a river, while one was
attempting to save the other; court held them to be licensees); Ryan v. Towar, 128
Mich. 463, 87 N.W. 644 (1901) (doctrine applies to the trespassers as well).
130. See note 123 supra.
131. There would probably be little doubt as to the determination of this threshold
question in most cases. Thus, in Clayton v. Blair, 254 Iowa 372, 117 N.W.2d 879
(1962), tenants died while attempting to arouse other tenants to warn them of fire
in apartment house, allegedly caused by negligently installed wiring. The appellate
court opinion reversed a jury verdict for defendant because of trial court's refusal to
give instruction on rescue doctrine. The jury verdict was apparently based on contributory negligence. Brock v. Peabody Co-op Equity Exch., 186 Kan. 657, 352
P.2d 37 (1960), involved a mother asphixiated by poisonous gas used to exterminate
pests in warehouse when she rushed to rescue her young son who was helpless inside.
Trial court's action in sustaining defendant's demurrer on ground of contributory
negligence reversed. It is interesting to note that concurrently with this case, there
was another action on behalf of the dead child on grounds of attractive nuisance.
Shank v. Peabody Co-op. Equity Exch., 186 Kan. 648, 352 P. 2d 41 (1960). See also
Parnell v. Security Elevator Co., supra note 127, in which the court said that the
defendant's liability to one whom he had asked to go to the rescue of a boy in a
grain storage pit did not depend upon how the boy came to be in the dangerous
situation. The plaintiff was an invitee on the premises. However, in Silbernagel v.
Voss, 265 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1959), the court found that the defendant was negligent
to one who fell from a ladder on the premises, and that he was also negligent to the
plaintiff who went to her rescue.
132. Brock v. Peabody Co-op. Equity Exeh., supra note 131. See also Truitt v.
Hays, 33 Pa. D. &C.2d 453 (C.P. 1963).
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will be barred solely because the one rescued suffered no harm.
It is perhaps in connection with two-party rescue situations that
correct analysis of the occupier's duty is most important. Professor
Bohlen some years ago detected the error in the tendency of a few
courts to assume that this duty ran to the one endangered, and then
extended somehow to the rescuer. 'm If this were true, a rescuer
could not recover from one who had placed himself in peril because
the defendant would have no cause of action against himself for his
4
own negligence. This problem was troublesome to a few courts,'3
but it now appears to be settled that the defendant's duty runs
directly to the rescuer, and his cause of action is based on the defendants conduct in creating the situation in which it was foreseeable that
someone would attempt the rescue. Thus, a rescuer may recover from
one who endangers himself, whether negligently ' 35 or deliberately, 30
under circumstances in which harm from a rescue attempt is foreseeable. 137
An important question in any rescue case is whether the plaintiffrescuer was guilty of contributory negligence. Manifestly, one who
voluntarily places himself in a dangerous situation is not exercising
the degree of care for his own safety which the law ordinarily requires
as a requisite for recovery in a negligence action. Equally manifest,
however, is the fact that the tort claim which has been the subject
of the foregoing discussion will be illusory if the defendant has
133. BoHLEN, STtuxEs IN THE LAW OF TonTs 569 n.33 (1926).

"The right to

recover cannot be based solely upon the wrongful conduct of the defendant toward
the person imperiled. To give one person a right of action, it is not enough that he
is harmed by an act which is wrongful towards another. The act must be wrongful
to the person injured as at least tending to create an undue risk of injury to him.
Nor has the rescuer any interest in the person rescued such as a husband has in the
services of his wife or a master in the services of his servant. His right to recover is,
therefore, not derived from the wrong to the person imperiled. Thus the rescuer is
not barred by the contributory negligence of the person whom he attempts to
rescue ....
" Ibid.
134. E.g., Dan v. Bryan, 49 Tenn. App. 250, 354 S.W.2d 483 (W.S. 1961); Saylor v.
Parsons, 122 Va. 679, 98 N.W. 500 (1904).
135. Carney v. Buyea, 271 App. Div. 338, 65 N.Y.S.2d 902 (4th Dep't 1946),
aff'd, 296 N.Y. 1056, 73 N.E.2d 120 (1947) (landowner rescued by tenant's guest
from being struck by her own car which she had negligently parked without securely
setting brake); Ruth v. Ruth, 213 Tenn. 82, 372 S.W.2d 285 (1963) (court expressly
held that the fact that the action is brought against the person being rescued does
not bar application of rescue doctrine).
136. Talbert v. Talbert, 22 Misc. 2d 782, 199 N.Y.S.2d 212 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (son
stated a cause of action for injuries sustained in rescuing his father from suicide
attempt.)
137. Thus, in Betz v. Glaser, 355 S.W.2d 611 (Mo. App. 1964), the occupier was
not liable to one who, while sawing an overhanging tree limb, fell to the ground
and was injured when he attempted to prevent the limb from falling on the occupier
as she walked underneath. The court held that the occupier could not have reasonably
foreseen the harm to the plaintiff.
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available the defense of contributory negligence based on the normal
standard of conduct. Plaintiffs are not so penalized, and the rule
appears to be clearly established that the plaintiff will not be barred
unless his conduct was rash or reckless. 138 It is submitted that this
standard should be related both to the degree of harm with which
the party sought to be rescued is threatened, and to the reasonableness of the plaintiff's belief that he can effect a rescue. Thus, where
one is observed in danger of slipping on a patch of ice on the premises,
the plaintiff may not be justified in dashing into a highway in the path
of oncoming traffic in an effort to reach the person and prevent the
fall. Again, if the plaintiff observes another engulfed in flame and
pinned beneath the fallen debris of a burning building, he may be
acting unreasonably if he moves into the danger zone in an attempt to
rescue. Where only property is in danger, the plaintiff should be held
to a higher standard of care than he would in rescuing persons. 139
If the situation involves action by the plaintiff to save both property
and persons, he should be given the benefit of the lower standard on
the presumption that his efforts were directed primarily to saving
people, unless there is clear evidence to the contrary. 140
In summary, occupiers of land may be subject to liability to those
who enter their premises in an attempt to rescue persons or property,
including the occupier, who have been placed in danger by the
occupier's negligence or design. The occupier may avoid liability by
showing that the plaintiff's rescue attempt or harm therefrom was
not foreseeable under the circumstances, or that the person rescued
would have had no cause of action against him if he had been injured,
or that the plaintiff acted rashly under the circumstances. The
doctrine appears to be generally well developed, and demonstrates a
proper concern by the law in fixing the responsibility for ultimate
harm at the point of ultimate cause.
B. Entry Upon Premisesfor the Purpose of Protecting
Persons or PropertyFrom DangerWithout
It has previously been shown that the law recognizes a privilege
for persons to enter the premises of others in an effort to reach
safety from some outside danger.' 41 Apparently, the exercise of this
138. The principle is discussed in Walker Hauling Co. v. Johnson, supra note
124; Clayton v. Blair, supra note 131, Brock v. Peabody Co-op. Equity Exch., supra

note 131.
139. See Eufemia v. Pacifico, 24 App. Div. 2d 673, 261 N.Y.S. 2d 100 (3d Dep't

1965).
140. Ellmaker v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 372 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. App. 1963)
(effort to stop automobile from rolling off premises into street).
141. See note 119 supra and accompanying text.
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privilege has not played a significant role insofar as occupiers' liability
is concerned. No cases were found in which the occupier was sued
on grounds of negligence by one who entered solely pursuant to the
privilege. 142 The language of the Restatement appears to include such
plaintiffs in the category of licensees unless they are injured on a part
of the premises then held open to the public, in which case they
would be owed the same duty owed to invitees. 143 This is, of course,
the same section which is applicable to firemen and policemen, but
the language is probably more nearly adequate as it relates to the
class of plaintiffs presently being considered. It will be remembered
that certain extensions of the occupier's duty were suggested in connection with firemen and policemen in order to give them the benefit
of the duty owed to any other class of persons. 44 The justification for
such reasoning was that the plaintiff's entry was not only privileged
but was also mandatory, was usually made in situations of emergency,
and was frequently of real benefit to the occupier. Plaintiffs who
enter to seek safety for themselves or their property, on the other
hand, present an entirely different situation. A desirable policy may
be served by treating such persons as invitees while on public
portions of the premises; that is, that occupiers who purport to
keep their premises safe for the public should be held responsible if
they fail to exercise reasonable care to make the actual condition
conform to the appearance. Beyond this, one who enters seeking
refuge for himself or his property should be entitled to no higher
duty than that owed to licensees. To be sure, this duty should conform
to the modern view of the Restatement which requires of the
occupier considerably more than to merely refrain from willfully or
wantonly inflicting injury.1 45 In any event, it is apparently rare indeed
for one who enters solely under the privilege to attempt to maintain a
negligence action against the one whose premises have provided him
with refuge.
VII. CONCLUSION

The law of landowners' liability has developed upon the basic
assumption that the occupier has the initiative to invite persons to
enter his premises and to exclude or expel those who are not wel142. In Rossi v. Del Ducca, 344 Mass. 66, 181 N.E.2d 591 (1962), a child was
granted recovery on ground of strict statutory liability to injuries suffered by a
dogbite on the defendant's premises. The plaintiff had entered the premises to escape
other dogs which were following her down the street. The court relied upon RETATV-

NmNT (SEcoND), TORTS § 197 (1965), to determine that she was not a trespasser and
was therefore entitled to the statute's protection.
143. Id., § 345. The same duties would apparently be owed to persons who enter
to retrieve their property from the premises. Id., comment a.
144. See notes 30-44 supra and accompanying text.
145. RESTAThmNT (SEcoND), TORTS §§ 342-45 (1965).

NOTES
come. However, as is true in the application of many general
rules in our legal order, an anomaly exists in connection with
persons who are privileged to enter irrespective of the occupier's
consent. Of the various classes of persons who are so privileged, the
greatest confusion in judicial analysis has arisen in connection with
firemen and policemen who come in emergencies and move throughout the premises in the discharge of their duties. The older consenus
seemed to resolve all difficulties in favor of the occupier, but the more
recent decisions reveal a changing attitude concerned with examining
the facts in each individual case. The occupier may no longer be
virtually heedless of the danger his premises may hold for the public
officer. It is further suggested that the extensions and modifications
of liability which have been discussed will assess the occupier no
more than is just in a complex and interdependent society.
Other public employees have long stood in a more favorable light,
and their cases are part of the broader law of occupiers' liability.
The interesting interrelation between the privilege of private necessity
and occupiers' liability has not been extensively developed, as only
few cases have arisen. Those involving the doctrine of rescue have
generally been properly decided, and reflect the awareness of modern
law that public stability in a dense society demands personal responsibility for reasonably foreseeable chain reactions.
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